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BASING-POINT PRICING ESTABLISHES
ILLEGAL VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
Elmer J. Schaefer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Basing-point pricing is a system of pricing in which a firm refuses to sell a product FOB and sets a delivered price that includes
transportation costs calculated from the same reference point used
by other firms in the industry. Used when transport costs are high,
this system enables every seller to quote a nearly identical price to
any particular customer, regardless of that customer's distance
from any particular seller. The costs and benefits of this practice
closely resemble the costs and benefits that result from pricefixing. Because the harm from an agreement to fix prices so often
exceeds the slight and rare benefit from that agreement, pricefixing is per se illegal. Basing-point pricing similarly causes more
harm than benefit and thus would almost uniformly be found unreasonable if tested under the rule of reason. 1 Therefore, any contract or combination that effectuates basing-point pricing should
be declared per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2
Enforcement of antitrust laws against basing-point pricing has,
however, been bedeviled by what may be called the "agreement
problem."3 Since members of an industry may adopt basing-point
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Northwestern University, B.A.,
1961; Harvard University, M.A., 1965; J.D., 1968. The author wishes to thank Timothy Hurley, Bruce Ballai, and Theordore Tondrowski for their thoughtful research assistanca on
portions of this Article.
1
Under the rule of reason, monopolies and combinations in restraint or trade are unl.a.wful only if their harms outweigh their benefits. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 59-60 (1911). However, "the inquiry is confined to a consideration or impact on competitive conditions." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'ra v. United States. 435 U.S. 679, 690
(1978).
2
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section provides in relevant part that "[e)very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.; cf. infra
notes 67-84 and accompanying text (basing-point pricing is always unreasonable).
3
For an excellent summary of the history of antitrust attacks on basing-point pricing, eee
Note, Conscious Parallelism in the Use of Delivered Pricing Systems: A Modified Per Se
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pricing through conscious parallelism rather than explicit communication on the subject, they can meet an antitrust challenge to the
practice by contending that section 1 does not apply absent proof
that the defendants "agreed" to adopt a basing-point system. At
best, litigation over the existence of a horizontal agreement will
involve protracted discovery of intercompany communications,
with the likelihood that a trial would require a complex examination of the economics of conscious parallelism:' At worst, a pernicious practice will escape antitrust liability.
It has long been thought that the agreement problem could be
avoided if the Federal Trade Commission condemned the use of
basing-point pricing as an unfair practice under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. G The Commission then would not
have to take a position on whether the parallel use of basing-point
pricing constitutes an "agreement."6 Two recent decisions, however, have cast doubt on this approach. In Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 7 the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a Federal Trade Commission order directing individual firms in the southern plywood
Standard of Review Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1194,
1200-10 (1981).
4
See infra notes 29 & 36-38 and accompanying text.
6
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see P. AREEDA, AmlTRUST ANALYSIS ll 331(a), at
394 (3d ed. 1981). In addition to bypassing the agreement problem, the use of § 5 to attack
devices that facilitate parallel pricing may provide other advantages. Drawing lines between
lawful and unlawful activities of oligopolists can be accomplished on a case-by-eliSe b!ISis by
the FTC, which is presumably expert in the economics of competition. Id. ll 574, at 833-34;
Note, supra note 3, at 1215 n.lll. The procedures of the FTC are especially well suited to
meet the concern that clear directions be given to oligopolists. Since the FTC's remedy is a
cease and desist order issued under 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1981), liability under § 5 ls
possible only if an enforceable order can be written. See infra notes 46-49 and accompany·
ing text. Finally, such an order is prospective only so that damages or other sanctions will be
awarded only for violation of a directive specifically addressed to tho defendant. But cf. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 46 AmlTRusT & 'I'RADE REG. REP. (BNA) 347, 352-53 (2d
Cir. 1984) (FTC should provide guidelines by which firms can predict when a violation of §
5 may be found).
6
Methods of competition that do not violate the Sherman Act because no agreement can
be shown may nevertheless violate § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965)
(dictum); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948) (dictum); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC,
389 F.2d 847, 859 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968); New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 351-52 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311
(1965); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95-98 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922) (unilateral activity held to violate § 5).
• 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
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industry to cease and desist from the use of basing-point pricing.
The court based its holding on the ground that insufficient proof
existed of the harmful effects caused by the pricing system.8 Given
the forensic difficulty of proving an adverse effect on prices,0 Boise
Cascade significantly diminishes the effectiveness of section 5 as a
means to avoid the agreement problem. In the second recent case
construing section 5, the Second Circuit has constructed another
obstacle to the use of this section to avoid the agreement problem.
The court held that section 5 cannot be applied to a noncollusive
business practice that causes substantial anticompetitive effects
unless the practice is also coercive, predatory, exclusionary, anticompetitive in purpose, or unsupported by a legitimate business
reason.10
This Article proposes another solution to the agreement problem, a solution that avoids evidentiary complexities and also permits private enforcement of antitrust laws against basing-point
pricing. The central premise of this approach is that a basing-point
practitioner enters into a vertical agreement every time he sells his
product to a customer. A vertical agreement violates section 1 of
the Sherman Act if it is unreasonable. One type of vertical agreement, the tying arrangement, is frequently illegal per se. By employing a basing-point pricing system, a producer necessarily refuses to sell FOB to a customer who wishes to provide his own
transportation. This practice constitutes a tie: the tied good is the
transportation service, and the tying good is the product being
sold.11 As a tie, the practice should be declared illegal per se. Even
if not characterized as a tying arrangement, however, the vertical
agreement between the seller and purchaser clearly produces harm
Id. at 577-81. For related developments, see infra note 45.
See Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 439,
475, 477-80 (1982}; Note, supra note 3, at 1212 nn.95-97. The difficulty is in establishing
what prices would have been in the absence of the challenged practice. This difficulty has
led to a liberalization of the rules for proving antitrust damages. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
10
E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 46 .ANrrrauST & 'l'RAD& REG. REP. (BNA} 347,
353 (2d Cir. 1984}. The court held alternatively that, even if § 5 could be applied to legitimate, noncollusive business practices that substantially lessen competition, a reduction in
competition sufficient to support finding a violation of § 5 had not been shown in the case at
8

9

hand.

The illegality of tying arrangements under § 1 of the Sherman Act is hlsed on § 3 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976}. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4387-88 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1984}; infra note 87.
11

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

532

[Vol. 18:529

without significant redeeming virtue and is thus unlawful under
the rule of reason. 12

II.
A.

CONSCIOUSLY PARALLEL PRICING AND THE AGREEMENT
PROBLEM

The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing

To maximize profits a monopolist sets his price above the marginal cost of production and sells less than would be sold if the industry were competitively organized. 13 In an industry with more
than one firm, an explicit price-fixing agreement may raise the
price above marginal cost and thereby achieve profits for the in·
dustry like those of a monopolist. By complying with the agree·
ment not to sell below the cartel price, firms reduce the supply of
output to the market. Carrying out a cartel agreement is easier if
the participating sellers are few and the product is homogeneous. 14
With price above marginal cost, the ability of the cartel to dupli·
cate the pricing policy of a monopoly is threatened by the tempta·
tion of each seller to cut his price a little below the cartel price and
thus increase his sales. 15
Both monopolies and price fixing cause harm through the distor·
tion of resource allocation which results from a price set in excess
See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
SeeP. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11114, at 13-16; E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND Eco·
NOMICS IN ANUTSHELL 56-67 (2d ed. 1981); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 481·98 (9th ed, 1964);
F. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 14-20 (2d ed.
1980); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Sherman Act was
motivated by "dread of enhancement of prices"}.
14
P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 320(b}, at 320. For discussions of conditions making price·
fixing easier, see R. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 336-38 (2d ed. 1981); F. ScHERER,
supra note 13, at 175-76. On the role of basing-point pricing in reducing barriers to con·
scious parallelism, see infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. Obviously, with fewer sell·
ers, reaching an agreement is easier, and the probability that price-fixing will be detected is
lower. See F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 199-200; cf. P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 262, at 276
(oligopoly aids conscious parallelism}. Again, with heterogeneous products, sellers must
reach agreement on a specific price for each product, and an individual seller is more likely
to disagree with the others as to the "fair" price for his product. As a result, "the difficulty
of coordination undoubtedly does increase more than proportionally with the number of
sellers." F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 200. By contrast, with a single, identical product,
only one price need be set for all sellers. See infra note 59 and accompanying text (homogo·
neity aids conscious parallelism).
10
P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 318(d), at 348-49: F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 171-73; G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 42 (1968).
12
13
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of marginal cost.16 In antitrust law, however, monopolies are
treated more favorably than cartels. A monopoly may be the result
of superior economic performance with benefits outweighing the
harm caused by inefficient resource allocation. 17 Indeed, to foster
such performance courts applying the rule of reason require proof
of wrongful conduct before finding liability under the Sherman
Act.18 Moreover, upon finding a violation courts hesitate to risk the
uncertain economic consequences of granting structural relief and
breaking up the monopoly.19 Thus, harm from monopoly pricing
may be tolerated simply because it is difficult to frame and enforce
an order directing a monopolist to price at reasonable levels.2 ° Cartels conversely do not possess the efficient integration of producSee, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, .ANrmtuST LAw '11403(b), at 271 (1978); F. ScnERsupra note 13, at 16-20.
17
See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The court commented:
[A per se rule against monopoly] might ••• deprive the leading firm in an industzy of
18

ER,

the incentive to exert its best efforts. Further success would yield not rewards but
legal castigation. The antitrust laws would thus compel the very sloth they were intended to prevent. We must always be mindful lest the Sherman Act be invoked perversely in favor of those who seek protection against the rigors of competition.
I d. at 273; see also Telex Corp. v. mM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925-27 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins."); 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, W 621-622; see generally Breyer,
The Problem of the Honest Monopolist, 44 .ANrmtuST L.J. 194 (1975).
18
Monopolies are covered under § 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see generally 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, '!ill 614-739. For a critical discussion of recent
developments in the law governing a monopolist's conduct, see Sullivan, Monopolization:
Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEx. L. REv.
587 (1982).
By analogy to the operation of a patent, monopoly pricing may be regarded as a way of
generating profits to reward an innovator. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, 11
622{a), at 59; cf. R. PosNER, .ANrmtuST LAw 13 n.7 (1976) {government may grant a monopoly to encourage certain kinds of activity). But see Williamson, Dominant Firms and the
Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1524 n.41
(1972) (reward for superior performance should not last indefinitely); Turner, The Scope of
Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1216, 1220-21
(1969).
18
See United States v. United Shoe :Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 {D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see also Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Py"hic Victories?, 12 J. L. & EcoN. 43 (1969) (arguing that divestiture of unlawfully merged firms is
often ineffective).
20
See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, '11710, at 149; cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (difficulty of telling whether a price
charged by a monopoly is reasonable).
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tion that characterizes a monopoly achieved through internal
growth. Therefore they typically lack the benefits needed under
the rule of reason to offset the harmful effects on resource allocation caused by distorted pricing.21 For this reason, antitrust law is
much more hostile to price fixing than to monopolies.
From experience with recurring situations, courts have developed per se rules to cut off litigation of certain issues that ordinarily must be resolved under the harm-benefit analysis of the rule of
reason. 22 In essence these per se rules are derived from an application of stare decisis to the rule of reason. 23 Given the complexity of
determining economic benefit and harm, the use of per se rules
saves a significant amount of judicial time and resources.
One such rule states that an agreement to fix prices is per se
illegal. 24 The agreement is conclusively presumed to have caused
harm. Thus, in order to establish liability a plaintiff need not
prove that the agreement affected prices in actual transactions. 211
Moreover, the per se rule conclusively presumes that the harm outweights any benefits derived from the agreement. Defendants are
therefore not permitted to introduce evidence to support a contention that, even if prices were fixed, there was a net benefit to society. The justification for this presumption is that the alleged benefits fall into familiar categories that have been rejected in the past
as unlikely, hard to establish, insignificant, and in any event accompanied by the relatively greater harm associated with the successful fixing of prices.26 As with any application of stare decisis,
•• See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 206(a), at 167; Barnett, Hills, Applebaum & Pollock,
Interview With William F. Baxter, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 35 (1981); cf. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (monopoly from internal
growth may bring benefits lacking in monopoly from merger).
In addition, the costs incurred in creating and defending monopolies and cartels may dif·
fer. R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 11-14. The costs of maintaining a cartel may be especially
high because a number of firms must cooperate and secrecy is necessitated by the threat of
criminal prosecution. The Antitrust Division routinely brings criminal prosecutions against
price fixers but files only civil complaints against monopolists•
.. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
13
Cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only after consid·
erable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
•• United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-24, 224 n.59 (1940).
•• See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
•• SeeP. AREEI>A, supra note 5, 11 312, at 329. Countries purporting to permit price fixing
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however, it is conceivable that a defendant could successfully distinguish his case from the precedents supporting the per se rule.
Thus, he might argue that the benefits flowing from the restraint
to which he was a party differ from the benefits rejected in the
previous decisions and that these benefits justify creating an exception to the per se rule. 27
B.

Conscious Parallelism

Firms in an industry with sufficiently few sellers to be characterized as an oligopoly may be able to achieve a price above marginal
cost, even though they communicate their intentions only through
the implicit signals embodied in each firm's announcements of
pricing policies.28 Whether such consciously parallel pricing policies have in fact been assisted by more direct communication is
usually difficult to determine. In almost every instance of parallel
pricing it is possible that no explicit communication took place.29
If successful, conscious parallelism based on implicit price signaling creates the same harm as an explicit agreement to fix prices.
In each, there is a substantial likelihood that the selling price will
be raised above marginal cost, and the benefits producers claim
from consciously parallel pricing resemble the benefits that have
been asserted for price fixing. 30 Nevertheless, there are two widely
held objections to declaring consciously parallel pricing a violation
of the antitrust laws.31 These objections, one doctrinal and one
practical, inhibit direct attacks on parallel pricing. In response, a
when benefits outweight harm almost never allow the restraint after evalU3tion. C{. Pengilley, Public Benefit in Anticompetitive Arrangements? Australian Ezperience Since 1974,
23 ANTrrRusT BULL. 187, 192-98, 218 (1978); Pengilley, Comments on Arguments in Justifi·
cation of Agreements in Restraint of Trade-The United Kingdom, Australian, and New
Zealand Ezperience, 19 ANTrrRuST BULL. 257, 261-80 (1974) •
..: Cf. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.; 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ('The
Supreme Court of the United States did not purport in the Northern Pacific case (Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)] to anticipate all or the possible circumstances
under which a tying arrangement might be used."), alf'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
28 See, e.g., P. AREIIDA, supra note 5, 'II 261(a), at 271.
so Cf. id. 'II 324(a)-{b), at 371 (either conscious parallelism or explicit communication is a
possible explanation for similar prices in an oligopoly); id. 'II 325, at 372 ("But quezy whether
the factors sometimes relied upon [to find an agreement] imply anything more than mere
interdependence.").
M Cf. infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (alleged benefits or basing-point pricing).
"' See P. AREIIDA, supra note 5, 1i'!l 324-25; Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).

536

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:529

number of indirect methods of attacking conscious parallelism
have developed. 32 For example, horizontal merger law has been relied on to limit the possibilities of consciously parallel pricing,83
legislation to permit breaking up firms in an oligopoly has been
proposed,34 and certain exchanges of information among competitors have been held unlawful on the ground that the exchanges facilitate conscious parallelism. 315
The doctrinal objection to a direct antitrust attack on "mere"
conscious parallelism is that firms engaging in parallel pricing
should not be found to have entered into an agreement unless the
factfinder concludes that an agreement was explicitly communicated. Phillip Areeda has characterized the cases as nearly unanimous in declaring that conscious parallelism alone does not constitute the contract, combination, or conspiracy called for in section 1
of the Sherman Act. 36 This view is implicit in decisions that permit
the factfinder to infer an agreement to fix prices from evidence of a
pattern of parallel pricing when augmented by a "plus factor,"
such as a discussion of prices among the defendants.37 The plus
factors persuade the factfinder that, rather than mere conscious
parallelism, an explicit communication of an agreement took
place. 38
Yet proof of an explicit agreement is not demanded by any linSee generally Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967).
88
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964) ("It
would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater is the likelihood that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not
competition, will emerge.").
84
For a discussion of two proposals, see P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 266. For another
proposal, see C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, .AmmtusT PoLICY 266-69 (1959).
80
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 456-57 (1978); United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); cf. Posner, Information and
Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1197-99
(1979) (favoring illegality of mere conscious parallelism when harm is likely, yet arguing
that certain exchanges of information should be permitted).
•e P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 325, at 372 n.16; see, e.g., North Carolina v. Chns. Pfizer &
Co., 384 F. Supp. 265, 283-86 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 67, 75-76 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
37
See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 325, at 373-82. "Plus" factors constitute "a web of
circumstantial evidence pointing very convincingly to the ultimate fact of agreement." Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 205 n.19 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
38
See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 325, at 372-73.
82

BASING-POINT PRICING

1984]

537

guistic or conceptual difficulty in characterizing conscious parallelism as an agreement. Richard Posner noted an analogy between
conscious parallelism and the unilateral contract formed when the
finder of a lost dog, by complying with the specified condition in
an offer of reward, communicates acceptance through actions
rather than words. Similarly, in conscious parallelism, the communication of both the offer and the acceptance may occur through
actions rather than words: one seller may communicate his offer by
restricting output; his rivals may accept this offer by restricting
their outputs.39 The result is "a literal meeting of the minds," a
mutual understanding, even if there is no overt communication." 0
Moreover, a verbal offer may be found in most instances of conscious parallelism. Areeda has suggested that a firm's public announcement of a plan to increase its list price can fairly be characterized as an invitation to other firms to match this increase." 1
Such an announcement satisfies the criterion for liability set forth
by Justice Stone in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States."" 2 "It
was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme
and participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others
were asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential to successful operation of the plan."" 3
Doctrinal insistence on finding an overt agreement has the ~y.rk
ward effect of shielding conscious parallelism from the reach of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, even though the harm caused by an
increase in price above the competitive level is the same whether
or not it results from overt agreement:'" The shield of course is
imperfect because through consideration of plus factors a
factfinder may condemn under section 1 conduct that arguably was
due only to conscious parallelism:' 11
•• R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 72.
ld. at 74.
n P. AlmEDA, supra note 5, 11 324(d), at 371•

•o

•• 306

u.s. 208 (1939).

•• Id. at 226.
•• See R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 41, 54-55.
•• P. AlmEnA, supra note 5, 11325. Plywood manufacturers who, in Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980), escaped liability under § 5 of the Federal Trode Commission Act because proof of either an agreement or an effect on price was lucking were Inter
found by a jury to have violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. In re Plywood Anitrust Litig., 655
F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 971 (1982), appeal dismissed per settle-
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The second objection to declaring "mere" parallel pricing unlawM
ful is rooted in the practical uncertainty that exists in drawing a
line between full-fledged conscious parallelism, which is certainly
unreasonable, and a firm's simple consideration of the impact its
price will have on the pricing policies of its rivals, a consideration
that seems both innocuous and impossible to prevent. Donald TurM
ner has expressed this concern most forcibly. 48 Suppose that firms
practicing conscious parallelism were found to have violated seeM
tion 1. How could an enforceable injunction against further wrongM
ful parallelism be phrased? Turner offered two examples of unM
workable formulations. An injunction prohibiting each defendant
from taking into account his rivals' reactions to his pricing deciM
sions would "demand such irrational behavior that full compliance
would be virtually impossible. ""7 An injunction ordering a defenM
dant to set a price equal to cost would require the determination in
enforcement proceedings of issues analogous to those arising in
public utility rate regulation, a task for which courts are illM
suited." 8 Turner's testing of the proposed line between legal and
illegal parallelism by asking whether particular injunctions would
be enforceable is illuminating, for an injunction is, in essence, a
restatement of the rule of liability drafted to fit the defendant's
circumstances.49
Uifficulty in formulating an enforceable injunction as a brightM
linEf test, however, should not preclude liability. A contract not
specifically enforceable nevertheless creates valid obligations, and
damages can be recovered for its breach.110 Indeed, not all injun eM
tions are precisely worded. Many civil rights injunctions contain a
provision that essentially repeats the statutory or constitutional
command: "Do not discriminate on the basis of race." 111 The fundaM
mental proposition of antitrust law, the rule of reason, states that,
ment, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983). These defendants paid the plaintiff class $165 million in settlement after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the jury verdict. 54 INDus. NEws REP. (Mooov's) 2942 (Jan. 23, 1983).
48
Turner, supra note 31, at 657-84.
47
Id. at 669.
48
I d. at 669-70; see also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, 11 841(a), at 362-63; cf,
Hay, supra note 9, at 441 n.7 (finding it intplausible to expect a firm with few rivals to
behave as though it had many).
4
~ 0. Fiss, THE ClVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8-9, 12-18 (1978).
00 E.A. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS 832 (1982).
01
0. Fiss, supra note 49, at 13.
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unless a per se rule has been announced, the legality of a practice
depends on a comparison of its harm and benefits. Although many
courts are reluctant to have contempt sanctions turn on such an
elaborate inquiry, liability for treble damages results if this balancing inquiry is resolved against a defendant. The Supreme Court
has even authorized criminal liability for a defendant who knows
that the consequences of his conduct would be anticompetitive.02
Richard Posner contends that coordinated pricing resulting in a
limitation on output and a higher than competitive price should be
held to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act even if no evidence of
an overt agreement exists.rs3 The merit of this proposal is in making liability turn on whether a defendant's activities were economically harmful. M Posner acknowledges the possibility that under
this approach a firm which had not in fact sought to match its
rivals' prices might erroneously be found liable, but he responds
that the problem of erroneous decisions pervades many areas of
the law. Protection against error, Posner argues, could be better
obtained by imposing a higher standard of proof when the only
evidence of collusive conduct is economic harm than by insisting
on evidence of an overt agreement before liability attaches.0 G
Those persuaded by Turner's demand for a bright-line test of
liability have been unwilling to condemn mere conscious parallelism but have argued instead for more precise descriptions of practices that facilitate conscious parallelism.rs6 Suppose, for example,
that in a given industry predisclosure by individual firms of
planned price changes was declared unreasonable. It would probably be easy to decide whether an order clearly prohibiting predisclosure had been violated. Existence of an issue as to the reasonableness of a particular instance of predisclosure then would not be
a bar to holding that activity unlawful; rather, the test would be
whether the general practice can pe described with sufficient preciUnited States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-46 (1978).
R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 71-75; see also L. SULLIVAN, .ANrn-RuST 355-58 (1977)
(section 1 should be read as governing conscious parallelism). For endorsements of the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act to oligopolists jointly possessing power over price, eee id.
at 361-64; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, 'lin 840-846.
.. R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 54-55.
6
• Id. at 75.
116 See Turner, supra note 31, at 675-78; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 16, 'II
841(a}; Hay, supra note 9, at 468-69, 480-81.
02
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sion that it is easy to determine whether a defendant has engaged
in the practice. Similarly, basing-point pricing is a facilitating device that can be subjected to such a prohibition. Simply prohibit
sellers from refusing to offer their customers the option of purchasing FQB.117
In sum, the practical objection to an attack on conscious parallelism-that illegal practices should be clearly describable-can be
overcome if unreasonable facilitating practices are forbidden. The
doctrinal objection to a direct antitrust attack, however, remains
and is strengthened by the recent refusals of the Second and Ninth
Circuits in the absence of proof of horizontal agreements to enforce
Federal Trade Commission orders issued against individual firms
under section 5.118

III.

BASING-POINT PRICING AS A PRACTICE THAT FACILITATES
CONSCIOUS pARALLELISM

For conscious parallelism to work, each seller must attempt to
match rather than undercut the prices of its rivals. This practice is
not feasible unless sellers can identify a specific price that each can
match and still maintain satisfactory market shares for all. Product diversity makes it difficult to calculate a suitable price for each
seller's product. 119 Even when the products are homogeneous, diversity exists if transportation costs are significant and sellers' plants
have different locations.60
Significant transportation costs confer on each seller a freight
advantage for sales within a region near his plant. Suppose that,
instead of adopting delivered pricing, each producer was willing to
sell FOB at his plant. Any producer with a mill price equal to that
Turner, supra note 31, at 675-78; see Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d
175, 179 (7th Cir. 1948) (individual employment of basing-point pricing condemned as an
unfair trade practice under § 5 of the FTC Act), aff'd sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC,
336 U.S. 956 (1949) (equally divided Court).
08
See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
09
See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 262(d), at 274-75; R. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra
note 14, at 337. For an explanation of the problem two individuals face when trying to arrive
at a matching result without communicating with each other, see T. SCHELLING, TilE STRATEGY OF CoNFLICT 54-67 (1960). This problem is complicated in the oligopoly context because
each seller has an incentive to increase his sales by secretly setting his price a little below
the price which his rivals are matching. See id. at 48-49; see generally Hay, supra note 9, at
448-49; cf. supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (homogeneity aids price-fixing),
•• See F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 325.
07
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of his rivals would then be able to make all the sales within his
freight advantage territory, and the fortuities of location would
give some rivals larger sales territories than others. Suppose now
that the producers attempted through conscious parallelism to
keep their mill prices equal and above marginal cost, while continuing to sell FOB. A mill with a smaller freight advantage territory
would be tempted to sell to customers outside its territory by reducing its mill price below the desired oligopoly level and absorbing the additional transportation costs the customer would otherwise incur. In order to maintain oligopolistic cooperation, firms
with large territories might be willing to tolerate some invasion by
firms with smaller territories, but there is no bright-line test to
identify the incursions that would be permitted. In the absence of
a bright line, consciously parallel maintenance of uniform mill
prices would be difficult to effectuate.61
A further difficulty would arise for a mill-pricing oligopoly in
which firms with large territories permitted firms with smaller territories to invade. If buyers provided their own transportation, an
invader could absorb freight costs only by charging the most distant buyer a lower mill price than that charged a customer inside
the invader's normal freight advantage territory. This would
amount to price discrimination, and price discrimination with a
homogeneous product is ineffective unless resale is prevented. Otherwise the customer benefiting from the invasion could profitably
resell the product near the mill of the invader, thus aamaging the
invader's price structure in his home territory.62
The barrier to oligopoly pricing created by spatial differentiation
may be overcome by use of a basing-point system, of which there
are several varieties.63 The basic idea may be illustrated by the
pricing method challenged in Boise Cascade. In this case, sellers in
the southern part of the United States quoted to a given customer
a delivered price that consisted of a uniform mill price plus the rail
freight charge from the west coast to the zone in which the cusI d. at 326-27. An oligopolist who uses FOB mill pricing and is tempted to c:ut prices to
enlarge his own territory would find that after retaliatory price c:utting each oligopolist had
the territory with which he started but was now selling at a lower price. "And each will soon
recognize that they will not endow many libraries through such uncooperative tactics." ]d.
at 327.
62
Such resale by a lower priced buyer is known as "arbitrage." Id. at 315.
63
See id. at 327-29; Note, supra note 3, at 1196-97.
61
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tomer was located. 64 With such a formula, a delivered price could
be calculated for each customer, and every seller could match that
price by following the formula. 611 Although, depending on their distance from the west coast, customers in different zones encountered different delivered prices, every seller quoted a particular
customer the same price. Thus, standardization as to each customer of the sum of the mill price and transportation cost was accomplished by calculating freight charges from a fixed reference
point, the west coast, rather than from each seller's plant.
Essential to successful employment of a basing-point system is
the refusal by each firm to sell FOB at his mill. Otherwise an alternative final price would be available to a customer willing to
provide his own transportation from the mill. This price would
equal the sum of the actual ·freight cost and the mill price. The
price would depend on the customer's distance from the seller and
would not be identical to the price yielded by the basing-point
formula. To prevent alternative pricing and to ensure the success
of their basing-point system, the defendants in Boise Cascade refused to sell FOB. 66
IV.

THE PERVASIVE UNREASONABLENESS OF BASING-POINT PRICING

The per se rule against price fixing avoids the expense of timeconsuming litigation with little loss in accuracy of decision. A rule
of reason inquiry would almost always conclude that price fixing is
illegal because any alleged benefits are illusory, infrequent, and
trivial when compared to the harm resulting from misallocation of
resources. 67
A basing-point system facilitates conscious parallelism, which results in the same harms as does explicit price fixing. Under a basing-point system, prices exceed marginal cost by more than they
otherwise would, and thus resource allocation is distorted.68 In addition, wasteful expenses and nonprice competition are stimu64

Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1980). The formula used in
Boise Cascade set up concentric bands running North to South and radiating eastward from
Portland, Oregon. Id.
•• A famous example is the submission of identical sealed bids of $3.286854 per barrel by
eleven cement firms. FTC v. Cement lnst. 333 U.S. 683, 713 n.15 (1948).
68
637 F.2d at 578.
87
See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
86
See supra note 16.
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lated. 69 Because a customer must pay the same price no matter
from whom he buys, basing-point systems encourage the excessive
use of transportation services.70 Sellers have an incentive to adopt
the mode of transportation on which the delivered-pricing formula
is based, even if another mode is cheaper, in order to forestall
buyer requests for a rebate.71 Finally, the price discrimination between zones that is inherent in a basing-point system causes further misallocation of resources. 72 Plants are likely to be located inefficiently as buyers seek to be close to the basing point.73
Similarly, the benefits claimed for basing-point pricing are as
specious as the·benefits asserted for price-fixing. For example, the
defendants in Boise Cascade argued that basing-point pricing satisfied buyer preferences for a form of price quotation which facilitated comparison with the west coast price.74 The Ninth Circuit
panel gave some credence to this argument by asserting that the
FTC had failed to prove use of the system by southern producers
was not "a natural competitive response to buyer preference for
traditional forms of price quotation.m11 Yet the familiar rule of reason inquiry as to whether a less restrictive alternative is available
undermines this justification for the practice of delivered pricing.76
In this case, a less restrictive alternative is obvious: the defendants
could have offered buyers a choice between adhering to the delivered pricing system and purchasing FOB.'1'1 A similar justification
for a horizontal agreement to eliminate granting short term credit
eo See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 318(d), at 349 n.36 (limitation of intemo.tional airline
cartel to service of sandwiches to economy class; after several carriers began serving elaborate meals on a slice of bread, six criteria were adopted to define a "sandwich"); F. ScJmR&R,
supra note 5, at 330, 331 n.42 (high selling expenses under basing-point pricing).
70
See F. SCJmR&R, supra note 13, at 330-31.
71
See id. at 331-32; F. 1\fAcHLUP, THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM 190-202 (1949).
72
See infra notes 96 & 116 and accompanying text.
73
F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 332-33; Note, supra note 3, at 1199 n.40.
7
• 637 F.2d at 578.
7
" 637 F.2d at 581.
76
See, e.g., ffiM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936) (requirement in lease
of tabulating machine that cards used with machine meet specifications would be a less
restrictive alternative than tying purchase of cards to lease or machine).
77
Other justifications for delivered pricing based on alleged buyer preferences have been
suggested. See Carlton, A Reexamination of Deliuered Pricing Systems, 26 J. L. & E<:oN.
51, 65, 69 (1983) (reduction of transactions costs; simplicity; allocation of uncertainty of
transportation costs to seller; toxicity of product). All such justifications fail because an
offer by defendant of an opportunity to purchase FOB is a less restrictive alternative.
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was once accepted as a potential defense by the Ninth Circuit:
competition might be enhanced by the increased visibility of prices
made possible by the elimination of credit.78 The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that an agreement to eliminate credit was merely a form of price fixing. Since price fixing
agreements have been adjudged to lack redeeming virtues, the trial
court could not consider any justification based on the challenged
agreement's informing function. 79
When transportation costs comprise a relatively small percentage of a product's price, a more appealing justification, of course,
supports delivered pricing. For example, price quotations are simplified when some mail order houses charge the same delivered
price to customers in all locations.80 Price matching, however, is
not a characteristic of the mail order industry, and the harms from
conscious parallelism are not present. 81 Moreover, with relatively
low transportation costs, delivered pricing may not entail a refusal
to sell FOB. If the transaction cost of arranging his own transportation is high relative to the transportation cost, a customer would
be genuinely uninterested in an offer to sell FOB. 82
Explicit horizontal agreements to adopt a basing-point system
have regularly been held illegal. 83 Since the harm caused by facilitating conscious parallelism outweighs the specious benefits that
may accompany basing-point pricing, a single firm's use of such a
system would always fail an examination under the rule of reason.
Thus, if a combination can be established so that section 1 of the
Sherman Act applies, basing-point pricing should be declared ille78
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S.
643 (1980).
•e 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980).
80
See Carlton, supra note 77, at 65.
81
Cf. Note, supra note 3, at 1200, 1215-16 (advocating per se illegality under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act when the same pricing scheme is used throughout the indus·
try, buyers and sellers are geographically dispersed, and sellers refuse to sell FOB).
82
The tying analysis outlined in this Article, see infra notes 85-136 and accompanying
text, by means of the less restrictive alternative argument, neatly carves out from per se
illegality an exception for delivered pricing justified by the unimportance of transportation
costs. In tying law, cost savings tend to support a conclusion that there is no tie. See, e.g.,
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. ffiM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 232 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd,
636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
83
See United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (agreement
not to adopt a given site as a basing point held a per se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act);
see also the survey of cases in Note, supra note 3, at 1201-03.
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gal per se. Only the doctrinal difficulty of the agreement problem
remains to bar a broad condemnation of basing-point pricing
under section 1.84

V.

BASING-POINT PRICING AS A TYING ARRANGEl\!ENT

There is no need to struggle to find a horizontal agreement when
an individual firm uses a basing-point pricing system. With each
sale the firm imposes on its customer a vertical restriction that is
essentially a tying arrangement. The application of section 1 of the
Sherman Act to a vertical agreement between a firm and its customer is familiar. 811 Once a tie is found, condemnation of the arrangement as per se illegal almost always follows upon the satisfaction of two criteria: (1) the tie must have a substantial effect in the
market for the tied good, measured by a relatively small sum of
dollars, and (2) the firm must possess the requisite degree of power
in the market for the tying good.86 For a typical firm employing
basing-point pricing, it will be relatively easy to demonstrate the
satisfaction of these criteria.
A.

The Existence of a Tie

When a firm using basing-point pricing refuses to sell FOB at its
plant, it imposes on its customers a tie between its product and the
transportation of that product. The main product, such as plywood, is the tying good; transportation is the tied good.87 An agreeSee supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 53, at 374-500.
86
See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500.06 (1969)
(Fortner 1). For an exception to the per se rule, see United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545, 555-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
87 Although § 3 of the Clayton Act does not apply because transportation is not a "commodity," § 1 of the Sherman Act fills the jurisdictional gaps. See Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1958). Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon,
such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or under84

85
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ment embodying this tie is created when a customer purchases plywood at the basing-point price.
Since the test for per se illegality is relatively easy to satisfy, the
firm's main hope of escaping liability is to contend that a tie does
not exist. In particular, the firm may argue that there is really only
one product involved: delivered plywood. Just such an argument
was thoughtfully analyzed in Anderson Foreign Motors v. New
England Toyota Distributor,88 where Judge Garrity observed that
the issue is "basically normative . . . should the seller be forced to
market the products separately?"89
One factor nonetheless likely to influence the decision whether a
firm is selling one product or two is not normative but conceptual:
which characterization is more consistent with ordinary language?
Plywood and transportation seem quite obviously to be separate
products. To speak of "delivered plywood" as a single product is
artificial. Referring to an automobile, the Anderson court suggested a distinction that helps elucidate this seemingly self-evident
point. In its undelivered state, the product is able to perform all
the functions for which it was designed. In its delivered state, the
product's ability to perform these functions remains unchanged
and no further qualities have been added. 90 Accordingly, the Uniform Commercial Code treats the undelivered item as the fundamental unit, and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the place
for delivery of goods is the seller's place of business. 91
A sale of two items in fixed proportions may suggest that the
firm is selling only one product. 92 The Anderson court also considstanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) (emphasis added).
•• 475 F. Supp. 973 (D. Mass. 1979) (manufacturer held to have tied transportation to sale
of automobiles when it sold only at delivered prices).
•• Id. at 982.
•• The Anderson court stated:
The automobile product and the delivery service do not naturally merge into a third
identifiable unit. Moreover, the finished Toyota automobile ••• is able to perform all
the functions for which it was designed. Delivering it to the dealer's location adds
nothing to the automobile qua automobile. In short, there is no relationship between
the car and its delivery inherent in the nature of the automobile itself and thus no
conceptual barrier to treating the two as separate products.
I d.
01
U.C.C. § 2-308(a) (1978).
•• See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Law, 72 HAnv.
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ered a variation of this argument. The defendant in Anderson
claimed that it sold transportation services in fixed proportion to
its main product, Toyota cars, in the sense that purchasing dealers
were not required to pay for transportation services beyond those
needed for their purchases of Toyotas.93 This argument strains the
use of the term "fixed proportion." In the economist's sense, transportation services are used in variable proportions when, for a
given amount of a product, the seller provides a different amount
of transportation to each customer, depending on the customer's
location.94 The chief significance of variable proportions as an indicator of a tying· arrangment is that a tie is often used to exploit a
monopoly position by price discrimination.911 In fact, price discrimination is an inherent characteristic of basing-point pricing, although the system differs in one respect from more typical examples of price discrimination. In the former, the customers who pay
more are those farther from the basing point. In the latter, higher
prices are paid by persons having a more intense demand for the
tying good.96 Although ultimately rejecting the defendant's argument, the Anderson court did suggest that the defendant's singleproduct defense was helped by the fact that the defendant's customers were not required to purchase transportation services beyond those actually needed.97 In this respect the case for rejecting
the single-product argument is even stronger with basing-point
pricing than in Anderson. Under a basing-point pricing system,
i:... REv. 50, 72 (1958); Note, Product Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-In
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 160, 167-68 (1972).
" 475 F. Supp. at 982-83.
94 See, e.g., C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 114-15 (rev. ed. 1969).
85 See Jefferson Parish Hasp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4388 n.23 (U.S. Mar.
27, 1984); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1977) (Fortner
P. ARElmA, supra note 5, 11 531(b), at 735. For a more general analysis, see Burstein, A
Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960). By collecting more money from
customers who are willing to pay more, the monopolist makes higher profits tlum if he
charged the same price to all customers. The amount of the tied good used often mensures
the intensity of the customer's desire for the tying good. For example, the number of cards
used with a computer is correlated with the usefulness of the computer to the customer. A
tying arrangement may, however, be profitable even though the customer does not use the
tied good in conjunction with the tying good. See id. at 74-76, 85-86.
98 See F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 327-29. Customers who pay more under basing-point
pricing are accidental victims of a clumsy facilitating device designed not to augment industry profits through price discrimination, but merely to cause prices to rise above marginal

m;

cost.
97

475 F. Supp. at 982.
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many customers are billed for phantom freight.
A related argument in favor of a single-product theory is that a
firm is selling a single product when the firm never sells one of the
two "components" without the other.98 Of course, continuing the
previous example, tying theory by definition recognizes that the tying good, plywood, is never sold without the tied good, transportation. The defendant's argument would have to be based on the additional fact that, if he is like most basing-point practitioners, the
manufacturer sells transportation services only in conjunction with
sales of plywood.
The answer to this argument, however, is that in a number of
tying cases liabilty was found even though the defendants sold the
tied good only in connection with the tying good.99 Moreover, practitioners of basing-point pricing employ a formula that treats the
mill price and the transportation charge from the basing point as
independent components of the delivered price. Separate treatment of these costs strongly suggests that both buyer and seller
regard the basic product and its transportation as separate
items. 100
A seller might argue that the parallel use of delivered pricing by
other firms in the industry demonstrates in practical terms the existence of a single product, for example, plywood with transportation. Judge Garrity disposed of such a contention in Anderson:
"All firms in an oligopolistic market ... might use the same economically inefficient, but financially lucrative, tie-in. If the uniformity of the practice were determinative, a clearly suspect tying
arrangement would often be insulated from per se scrutiny."101
Moreover, in a case like Boise Cascade this argument is refuted by
88

See United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pn. 1960), aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see also Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 872, 874-75 (D. Minn. 1971) (advertising not tied to purchase of franchise since
advertising and franchise are always sold together in the industry), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th
Cir. 1972).
e• See, e.g., Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 42, 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1976); Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 n.4 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972).
100
See United States v. J·errold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pn. 1960), aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 52
U.S.L.W. 4385, 4391 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1984); Anderson Foreign Motors v. New England Toyota
Distrib., 475 F. Supp. 973, 983 (D. Mass. 1979); Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 872, 874-75 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972).
101
475 F. Supp. at 983.
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the fact that at the retail level plywood is often sold without transportation. Finally, for most products sold under a basing-point
pricing system, no significant savings in cost seem to result if the
seller rather than the buyer arranges for the transportation. 102
Altogether apart from the single-product argument is the contention that the seller merely "purchases" transportation services
for resale and therefore is not an active competitor in the tied-good
market. 103 This contention can also be met by citation of precedent. Arrangements are routinely characterized as ties even though
defendants purchased the tied good for resale to their customers.1M

B. Sufficient Effects in the Tied Good Market
Once a tie has been found, courts apply a two-pronged test for
determining per se illegality. The first prong requires a substantial
effect in the market for the tied good. This is satisfied merely by
showing that a tie has affected annual sales in the tied good market worth $500,000.105 When firms adopt a basing-point system,
the product is usually heavy and bulky, so transportation costs are
high. For example, in Boise Cascade each plywood producer's annual use of transportation services easily exceeded the threshold
amount. 108
The pertinence of this criterion is discussed supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Thus the seller arguably would not be covered by the langusge of § 3 of the Clayton
Act on which tying law under§ 1 of the Sherman Act is based. See supra notes 11 & 87.
104
See supra note 99. Moreover, an illegal tie exists if a seller requires his customers to
purchase the tied good from a third company that in tum pays a rebate to the seller. E.g.,
Ohio-Sealy Mattress :Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 834, 839-40 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
10
° Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969) (Fortner ij; Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947). Smaller sums have been held "not insubstantial." Aqua Flame, Inc.
v. Imperial Fountains, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 736, 740 n.10 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ($74,250); Detroit
City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 472 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
($86,376.72). To date, apparently no defendant has argued that the dollar figures in earlier
cases should be adjusted to reflect inflation, although in most cases the threshold of substantiality would still be easily cleared. For a discussion of the issues created by inflation
when statutes refer to fixed dollar amounts, see G. CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAw FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 40, 65-68 (1982).
106
In 1971, for example, the lowest production by any of the five defendants was Willamette's 1,001,523 thousand square feet on a % inch basis. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 13
(1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). Following an exnmple in the opinion, 91 F.T.C. at 43 n.75, a minimum freight charge for Willamette may be calculated on the
102
103
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In the unlikely event that a firm's basing-point charges for trans-

portation total less than $500,000, a plaintiff may successfully argue that the sales figure in the tied good market for the individual
defendant should be considered together with the aggregate sales
of the other sellers using similar tying arrangements. 107 Moreover,
a tying arrangement which does not satisfy the "effects" prong of
the test for per se illegality may still be declared unreasonable. 108
Because basing-point pricing is almost always harmful, the plaintiff should prevail in such a rule of reason inquiry. 109 Indeed, this
inquiry would merely be a special case of the more general proposition that an unreasonable vertical restriction is unlawful. 110

C. Power to Require a Tie
The second prong of the test for per se illegality of a tying arrangement requires sufficient economic power in the market for
the tying good. Justice Stevens has written the last two opinions of
the Supreme Court that addressed this issue. In United States
assumption that all shipments were made to the freight zone closest to the west coast on
January 29, 1971, id. at 33, using the standard formula for translating thousands of squnro
feet on a % inch basis into pounds, id. at 30-31. The freight cost then equals 1,001,623
thousand square feet multiplied by 1125 pounds per thousand square feet multiplied by
$0.46 per 100 pounds, or a total of $5,182,881.53.
In imitating the sample calculation, it is assumed that there are two errors in the FTC's
opinion: the freight rates, id. at 33, should be given as "per hundred pounds" rather than
"per thousand pounds," and the association weights, id. at 31, should be given as "per thou·
sand square feet" rather than "per thousand pounds." Even if the freight raw were $0.46
per thousand pounds, however, the transportation sales for Willamette would equal
$518,288.15, which still exceeds $500,000.
107
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 41-43, 49 (1962). In Loew's, film distributors
engaged in block booking, i.e., selling films to television stations only in a package and refus·
ing to sell individual films separately. The parallel use of block booking seems to have af·
fected adversely the Court's evaluation of the legality of an individual firm's conduct, since
the Court discussed the effect of all 25 contracts together and found a violation by a firm
which had received only $60,800 in total payments. Cf. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC,
132 F.2d 48, 54 (4th Cir. 1942) (cease and desist orders entered upon findings that three
companies had % to 3.4 of the market for the tying goods and a considerable percentage of
the market for the tied good, a large volume of trade was affected, and thus a substantial
lessening of competition resulted).
108
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4392·93 (U.S. Mar.
27, 1984) (when test for per se illegality not satisfied, a rule of reason inquiry must be un·
dertaken); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1969) (Fort·
ner I) (failure to satisfy two-prong tying test simply means that defendant's conduct is not
per se illegal).
108
See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
110
See infra text accompanying note 138.
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Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises (Fortner m,111 Justice Stevens
concluded that prior decisions of the Court "focus attention on the
question whether the seller has the power within the market for
the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market."112 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v.
Hyde, 113 he stated that tying arrangements are unlawful "when the
seller has some special ability-usually called 'market power'-to
force a purchaser to do something he would not do in a competitive market."114
The forcing of burdensome terms upon buyers obviously occurs
in a basing-point system, since buyers farther from the basing
point than from the nearest seller must pay phantom freight.
Purchases of the tied good at prices above the market price provide convincing evidence, absent any other explanation, that the
seller has sufficient power in the market for the tying good to
"forc[e] purchases that would not otherwise be made."m1
The price discrimination that results from the payment of phantom freight under a basing-point pricing system is inconsistent
with a completely competitive market in which firms lack power
over price.116 With competition, differentials in profitability in
serving different customers would disappear as firms cut prices to
make sales to the more attractive customers. Under a basing-point
system, the differentials persist. Moreover, since customers who
yield the least profit continue to be supplied, customers being
429 u.s. 610 (1977).
Id. at 620.
us 52 U.S.L.W. 4385 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1984).
114
Id. at 4388.
110 Id. at 4392; see also Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods,
Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976). Refusing to allow customers to purchase transportation
separately is also burdensome because it facilitates conscious parallelism, which would not
occur in a competitive market.
118
See R. PosNER, supra note 18, at 63; cf. Fortner ll. The Supreme Court in Fortner II
stated:
In some tying situations a disproportionately large volume of sales of the tied product
resulting from only a few strategic sales of the tying product may reflect a form of
economic "leverage" that is probative of power in the market for the tying product.
If, as some economists have suggested, the purpose of a tie·in is often to facilitate
price discrimination, such evidence would imply the existence of power that a free
market would not tolerate.
429 U.S. at 617.
111

112
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served at higher profit are clearly paying a price greater than marginal cost.
In an industry with a basing-point pricing system, the power of
each firm to impose a tie results primarily from an oligopolistic
market structure rather than monopoly power.117 An individual
firm's power to insist on tying transportation services to its main
product is derived in large part from the simultaneous refusal of
its rivals to sell FOB, just as its power to set a price above marginal cost is augmented by the unwillingness of its rivals to expand
production rather than by their inability to do so. When market
power is used to force unwilling buyers to accept a tie, however,
the source of that power should be irrelevant. Even if market
power stems from superior economic performance, its misuse to
impair competition on the merits in a separate market is illegal per
se.118 A fortiori, the misuse of economic power stemming from conscious parallelism, which lacks the benefits often associated with
monopoly power,119 should also be illegal per se.120 Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, the core around which tying law developed,121 does
not refer to the source of the economic power used to limit customer choice.122
The Supreme Court has twice indicated that the failure of competitors to offer to sell the tying good and the tied good separately
plays an important role in determining whether a seller has sufficient power to force a tie on buyers.123 Similarly, Professor Areeda
m Cf. P. AREEnA, supra note 5, 11 246(a), at 243 (suggesting a distinction between oligop·
oly and monopoly power).
118
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4388-89 (U.S. Mar.
27, 1984).
119 See supra notes 17-18, 21 & 30 and accompanying text.
120
In N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1971), a
firm was found to have illegally tied remote control cables to its outboard engines. Tho
market for outboards was highly concentrated. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d
971, 974 (8th Cir. 1981) (In 1973, four firms had 94.9% of the United States market in terms
of units sold.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). Thus, the defendant's market power might
well have depended on conscious parallel pricing by its rivals in the market for the tying
good.
m Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4387·88 (U.S. Mar.
27, 1984) (congressional finding made in Clayton Act concerning the competitive conse·
quences of tying must be respected in a Sherman Act case).
112
See supra notes 11 & 87.
111
See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4388 ("If each of the products may bo
purchased separately in a competitive market, one seller's decision to sell the two in a single
package imposes no unreasonable restraint on either market, particularly if competing sup·
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has concluded that, when a seller "offers an A-B package purchased by the plaintiff who is unable to buy A alone from that
seller or anyone else," a tie is apparently present. 12' This conclusion was also reached in a case where three companies had at least
two-thirds of the sales in the tying good market; each firm was
pliers are free to sell either the entire package or its several parts."); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) ("[I]f one of a dozen food stores in a community were to
refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.").
124
P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 11 541, at 763. Relying on the following language in Justice
Stevens' Fortner IT opinion, a defendant might argue that an oligopolist's power cannot be
the basis for imposing liability for an illegal tie:
In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product. Without any such advantage differentiating his product from that of his competitors, the seller's product does not have
the kind of uniqueness considered relevant in prior tying-clause cases. ••• "Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented
from offering the distinctive product themselves."
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 620·21 (quoting Fortner I, 394
U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969)). Twice elsewhere in Fortner IT Justice Stevens noted the lack of
evidence that the defendant, United States Steel Corp., had a cost advantage over other
sellers, who in this case were lenders of credit. 429 U.S. at 617, 622.
Fortner IT, however, was not a case in which competitors in the market for the tying good
also refused to sell the tying good separately. The plaintiff alleged an illegal tie, with the
tied good being steel components for a prefabricated house that was sold at a price above
the market price and the tying good being credit provided at an interest rote below the
market rate for such a loan. In these circumstances, the only possible source of power to
force the plaintiff to buy unwanted steel would have been a cost advantage in the credit
market. Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that, instead of having the power to force the
plaintiff to buy its steel, the defendant had simply been willing to accept a lesser profit or
incur greater risks than its competitors: "The usual credit bargain offered to Fortner proves
nothing more than a willingness to provide cheap financing in order to sell expensive
houses." 429 U.S. at 612 n.1, 618, 621-622.
Justice Stevens also noted that "[t]he tie-in in this case can be explained as a form of
price competition in the tied product. •••" Id. at 619 n.10. A tie embodying a disguised
price cut that may have procompetitive effects in destabilizing conscious parnllelism differs
significantly from basing-point pricing, in which typically the price for the package of the
main product and transportation is not below the price competing firms charge for that
package but rather is exactly equal to that price. The former tie may produce at least as
much benefit as it does harm; the latter tie does not.
The former kind of tie is illustrated by unsystematic freight absorption, in which a seller
selectively offers a delivered price embodying a freight charge that is less than the actual
cost of transportation. Some economists regard this practice as desirable because it tends to
stimulate price competition. See F. ScHERER, supra note 13, at 330; Kaysen, Basing-Point
Pricing and Public Policy, 63 Q. J. EcoN. 298, 313 (1949); Stocking, The Law on BasingPoint Pricing: Confusion or Competition, 2 Pun. L. 1, 27-28 (1953). Under Fortner IT, unsystematic freight absorption embodying a disguised price cut would not constitute an illegal tie.
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found to have engaged in the illegal tying. 12 G
Considering the conduct of others in determining the legality of
a vertical agreement is not new to antitrust law. The effects of one
firm's tying arrangement have been judged in light of the use by
competitors of similar ties. 126 Moreover, the adoption of similar
practices by other firms is relevant to an assessment of the effects
of exclusive dealing, 127 a practice related to tying. 12s Such an analysis of the power of an individual firm in an industry with basingpoint pricing does not require imposition on the defendant of any
sort of horizontal responsibility for the parallel practice. Instead, a
vertical agreement between the individual defendant and his cusSignode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1942). Cf. Moore v. Jas.
H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1211-12, 1215-16, 1220 (9th Cir. 1977) (remanding for
trial tying claims against eight cemeteries accounting for 78% of interments in a given
county, when five had independently adopted one restriction and all eight had independently adopted another restriction; no suggestion that existence of parallel practices negated
individual power). In addition to a firm's power to impose a tie when its competitors impose
a sinillar tie, a firm adopting basing-point pricing may also have some individual monopoly
power resulting from its location or product differentiation. Spatial differentiation of producers is a precondition for developing a basing-point pricing system. Thou.gh tho system
prevents a spatial advantage from being reflected in the price, the closest mill may be able
to offer quicker service. Moreover, the gap between price and marginal cost give3 each firm
an incentive to differentiate its product, which may be done, for example, by using salesmen
when other firms do not. See supra note 69.
The market power requirement for per se illegality is satisfied by a relatively modest de·
gree of product differentiation. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-48
(1962) (individual variations in each copyrighted film confirm the presumption of market
power that results from the existence of the copyright); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536
F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976) (market power found where franchisor advertised for franchisees
throughout the Southwest and had a well-known public image). But cf. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 52 U.S.L.W. 4385, 4392 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1984) (hospital did not
have market power within its neighborhood when 70% of patients residing in that neighborhood chose other hospitals).
no See supra note 107.
107
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). In Motion Picture,
the Supreme Court stated:
[D]ue to the exclusive contracts, respondent and the three other major companies
have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available outlets for this business
throughout the United States. It is, we think, plain • • • that a device which has
sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act • • • •
ld. at 395; see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949) (discussing
parallel use of exclusive dealing by others and finding illegal effect on competition); P.
AREEDA, supra note 5, llll 565-66, at 823-24 (percentage of foreclosure by similar agreements
should affect the evaluation of an exclusive dealing arrangement).
128
See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, ll 557, at 809; id. ll 561, at 819.
120
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tomer is solely identified and examined to reveal that the agreement results in considerable harm without significant redeeming
virtue.
D. Per Se Illegality of the Tying Arrangement
The conclusion that basing-point pricing is pervasively unreasonable, which follows from a comparison with price fixing,l 29 also
follows a fortiori from a comparison with a conventional tying arrangement that satisfies the test for per se illegality. The policy
ground for condemning the more familiar tying arrangement is
that the tie interferes with competition on the merits in the market for the tied good.130 Basing-point pricing similarly interferes
with competition on the merits. Purchasers of the main product
are precluded from choosing among available transportation services. Moreover, under a basing-point system many customers
must pay for phantom freight, so the effective charge for transportation exceeds the competitive market price. Conventional tying
arrangements, in comparison, are held illegal even though the price
charged for the tied good is not above the competitive market price
for that good. 131 In fact, a competitive conditions clause permitting
a buyer to escape from the tie when a lower rate for the tied good
can be found does not save an otherwise illegal tie.132
The price discrimination implicit in a basing-point pricing system in addition is more harmful than the price discrimination facilitated by conventional tying arrangements. 133 While the price
discrimination often caused by a conventional tie has an allocative
effect that is difficult to assess,134 the arbitrary price discrimination
See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4388-89; Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04, 508-09 (1969) (Fortner ij; see also P. AREEDA,
supra note 5, 1! 530, at 732-33. Commentators have attacked the "competition on the merits" rationale as being unsound. See, e.g., R. PosNER, supra note 18, nt 174-76; Bilker, The
Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REv. 1235,
1267-74 (1980).
Isi See N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard ll.iarine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 521 (D. DeL
1971); see also Burstein, supra note 95, at 67 n.21 (citing judicial precedent and secondnry
authority).
Iso Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958); Intemntionnl Snit Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947).
Iss See Burstein, supra note 95, passim; supra notes 67-73 & 122 and accompanying text.
IM See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4394 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring); R.
PosNER, supra note 18, at 64-65, 176-84.
Ioo
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resulting from basing-point pricing undoubtedly misallocates resources.11115 Finally, basing-point pricing causes harm not usually
associated with tying arrangements: it facilitates conscious parallelism. 1118

VJ.

BASING-POINT PRICING AS AN ILLEGAL VERTICAL AGREEMENT
EVEN IF NoT DEEMED A TYING ARRANGEMENT

Even if the arrangement is not characterized as a tie, a buyer's
acceptance of an offer conditioned by the seller's refusal to sell
FOB creates an illegal vertical agreement when tested under the
rule of reason. 137 Indeed, the pervasive unreasonableness of basingpoint pricing requires per se illegality.138 Thus, evidence justifying
a basing-point arrangement should not be admissible, nor should
courts require a plaintiff to prove an effect on price in order to
establish liability.1311

vn.

SoME CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY BASED ON VERTICAL
ANALYSIS

A. Remedies
Remedying a firm's illegal use of basing-point pricing presents
no unusual difficulties, for an enforceable injunction is easy to
draft. The firm must offer to sell FOB. 140 Attempted evasion by
subterfuge, of course, is theoretically possible. For example, a firm
might quote an unrealistically high FOB price, thus forcing its cusSee supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Recent studies of two leading tying cases demonstrate that the arrangements may
have facilitated price fixing or conscious parallelism in the market for the tied good. See
Cummings & Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J. L. & EcoN. 329, 342-50 (1979) (con·
eluding that in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), purpose of tying
arrangement with competitive conditions clause was to gather information on price and non·
price competition in an industry where rate bureaus had established lawful price-fixing
agreements); Peterman, The Intemahonal Salt Case, 22 J. L. & EcoN. 351, 360·62 (1979)
(suggesting that in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), tie with
competitive conditions clause might have served to monitor price cutting if a cartel or con·
scious parallelism existed in the market for the tied good).
Jl'7 The same conclusion follows if basing-point pricing is characterized as a tie but the
requirements for per se illegality are not satisfied. See supra notes 108-09 and accompany·
ing text.
•aa See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
zu Note, however, that harm must be established to recover treble damages. See infra
notea 144-47 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
116

1111
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tamers to "choose" purchasing on a delivered-pricing basis. As
with other subterfuges intended to disguise a tie,141 however, detection in this case would pose relatively simple factual issues. The
package price quotation plus any savings in transaction costs142 can
easily be compared to the FOB price quotation plus the lowest
freight rate available. If the former is consistently less than the
latter-that is, if the FOB price exceeds the package price minus
the transportation cost and if this excess cannot be justified by
cost-savings resulting from delivery by the seller-then the injunction has been violated. 143
In proving damages a plaintiff may wish to use tying precedents
in which courts have awarded three times the amount by which the
price paid for the tied good exceeded the market price.144 Phantom
freight paid by the plaintiff constitutes such an overcharge.1411
Some tying cases, however, have required plaintiffs to prove that
the price paid for the package of tying and tied goods exceeded the
combined market prices for these goods. 146 Accordingly, a plaintiff
might have to prove what the market price for the main product
would have been in the absence of basing-point pricing.147 In any
m See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52-56 (1962) (modifying decree to prevent future disguised tie). For a discussion of the issues in drafting such a decree, sea P.
AREEDA, supra note 5, ~ 545(a), at 770; id. ~ 546(d), at 772.
142
Any savings in transaction costs are probably trivial.
us Permitting a firm to offer transportation plus the main product as a package that
embodies a disguised price tends to destabilize conscious parallelism. For this reason some
economists favor a regime of unsystematic discriminatory freight absorption. See supra note
124.
... See, e.g., Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 50-51 (5th Cir. 1976).
140
See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1981) (jury awarded
amount of phantom freight as damages for conspiracy to impose basing-point pricing), cert.
granted, 456 U.S. 971 (1982), appeal dismissed per settlement, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
148
See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
147
Defendants have speculated that the price for the main product could have been increased bad basing-point pricing not been employed. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Fl'C, 637
F.2d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 1980) (court accepts "common-sense proposition that southern producers would simply adjust the index price upwards if they were quoting delivered prices in
terms of actual freight"). Such speculation is unsound. Even a single firm's abandoning a
system of basing-point pricing would tend to destabilize conscious parallelism and cause the
effective price level for the package of main product and transportation to fnll See supra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text. The adoption of basing-point pricing reflected each defendant's business judgment that conscious parallelism would work poorly without that facilitating device. Otherwise, they would not have incurred the wasteful transportation costs
that basing-point pricing entails. See Smithies, Aspects of the Basing-Point System, 32 Au.
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event, a plaintiff near the basing point who paid little or no phantom freight might still seek damages based on the theory that conscious parallelism facilitated by basing-point pricing inflated the
market price for the main product.
Proving the effect of an illegal practice on market price presents
statistical difficulties. Confronted by these difficulties, an antitrust
plaintiff need merely introduce evidence from which a just and
reasonable estimate of damages can be made, provided he first establishes that some damage occurred. 148 If the damage issue is
tried after basing-point pricing has ended, perhaps as a result of
preliminary injunctive relief, before-and-after evidence of the impact on prices will be available. 149 In any event, a plaintiff can argue that the mill price used in the basing-point formula must have
exceeded marginal cost, at least for producers making sales at the
mill price to customers at the basing point. If there are many producers, the plaintiff may argue persuasively that without basingpoint pricing the mill price would have equaled marginal cost and
thus would have been at least as low as the mill price used in the
basing-point formula. The defendant should not be permitted to
speculate that, even without basing-point pricing, conscious parallelism would have kept the market price above marginal cost. Conscious parallelism violates public policy. 1110 It escapes antitrust enforcement only because of doctrinal and remedial difficulties. 1G1
As injunctive relief and the threat of damages induce the abandonment of basing-point pricing, wasteful cross hauling will be
eliminated. Enhanced price competition is likely to result, and the
average sum paid for the main product and transportation should
fall.1112
B. Advantages of Vertical Analysis Over the Use of Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act
A cease and desist order issued under section 5 of the Federal
EcoN. REv. 706, 710-12 (1942).
148
See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263-66 (1946).
ua For a thorough account of the effective use of such evidence, see C. BANE, TnE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS 328-38, 369-78 (1973).
IGo See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
IGI See supra notes 31 & 36-58 and accompanying text.
IGa See supra note 147; cf. F. MAcHLUP, supra note 71, at 204-08 (decrease in package
price to be expected from adoption of uniform mill pricing).
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Trade Commission Act may seem to have an advantage in avoiding
the vagaries of private antitrust enforcement with its retroactive
penalties.1153 This advantage is illusory. Private enforcement facilitates the detection of antitrust violations and tends to cause expenditures for enforcement to vary in accordance with the harm
resulting from the violation. 1154 Courts have sufficient expertise to
evaluate the benefits and harms of basing-point pricing, since these
resemble the benefits and harms of price fixing. Fear of unfair surprise from the application of retroactive penalties is unwarranted. 11515 Firms that practice basing-point pricing have always
risked litigation by plaintiffs attempting to prove the existence of
explicit collusion and thus a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 1156 Moreover, the use of tying law suggested in this Article involves the application of accepted precedents to a defendant's unilateral refusal to quote prices FOB. Liability in treble damages
suits for conduct that was public and not previously adjudicated as
unlawful is a familiar phenomenon. 1157
VITI.

CONCLUSION

Once the fact that basing-point pricing establishes vertical
agreements is recognized, the agreement objection to applying section 1 of the Sherman Act is overcome, and the practice may be
judged on its economic merits. 1158 So judged, the practice is per se
illegal. The elimination of basing-point pricing should diminish the
See P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 1! 574, at 833; supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the advantages of private enforcement, see Becker & Stigler, Law
Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974). For
a further discussion of its advantages and disadvantages, see R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANAL-a"SLS
OF LAw 461-67 (2d ed. 1977}.
1
"" For a discussion of unfair surprise resulting from retroactive penalties, see P. AREEDA,
supra note 5, 1! 574, at 833.
106
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
IllS This vertical agreement analysis overcomes the agreement problem in the case of at
least one other device that may facilitate conscious parallelism. A price protection or most
favored customer clause in a contract betWeen a buyer and seller typically guarantees the
buyer the lowest price paid by any other customer. See Hay, supra note 9, at 455-56, 473
n.130. Obviously, a vertical agreement is present. The issue under § 1 is whether this agreement fails a test under the rule of reason. For a discussion of the reasonableness of most
favored customer clauses, see S. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination (Nov. 11, 1982} (unpublished manuscript) (available at Georgetown University Law
Center}. See also Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WISe. L. REv. 887, 901-02, 932-35.
103
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misallocations caused by conscious parallelism in those industries
that have adopted this practice.
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